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1. Introduction 
 
Cost of Service (COS) regulation has been the basic framework for price setting of infrastructure 
services in the U.S. and it has evolved substantially over time as a result of both judicial review 
and conceptual developments in regulatory economics. In its purest form, COS regulation is an 
ex post mechanism whereby the costs incurred by the firm in providing the service (including the 
opportunity cost of capital) are computed and the price is set by the regulator to cover these 
costs. While this type of regulation could in principle restrict the firm’s ability to extract economic 
rents – as prices are set so that the firm can only recover costs, including a competitive rate of 
return on capital – and avoid adverse selection, as prices are based on actual costs, it can lead to 
moral hazard in that firms face a diminished incentive to minimise costs.
1  
 
Price Cap (PC) regulation, which has been used to set regulated prices in the UK since it was 
proposed  by  Stephen  Littlechild  (1983),  offers  a  solution  to  the  moral  hazard  problem.  PC 
regulation is an ex ante mechanism that sets a fixed price. When faced with a fixed price, the 
firm’s incentive is to produce at the lowest possible cost. In practice, however, regulators cannot 
fix prices for the entire life of regulated assets, which are typically long-lived. Thus, PC regulation 
involves setting maximum prices for a regulatory period (typically 5 years). As a result, although 
PC  regulation  successfully  addresses  moral  hazard,  its  implementation  reintroduces  adverse 
selection. This follows as the prospect of a price revision at the end of the regulatory period might 
distort the firm’s behaviour.  
 
The  incentive  effects  of  these  two  different  types  of  price  regulation  regarding  informational 
asymmetries are well documented.
2 However, their impact on the incentives to invest and more 
specifically on the firm’s cost of capital is not as well understood. This is an important gap in the 
literature that this paper addresses. 
 
The importance of understanding the relationship between PC regulation and the firm’s cost of 
capital is reflected, for instance, in the project RPI@20 undertaken by OFGEM, the regulator for 
the  UK  gas  and  electricity  network  services.  The  objective  of  RPI@20  is  to  propose  a  new 
regulatory  regime  that  is  friendlier  to  investment  than  PC  regulation 
(http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/rpix20/Pages/RPIX20.aspx). PC regulation will also have to 
provide the correct incentives for the deployment of fibre-optic infrastructure and so-called Next 
                                                 
1 In addition, COS regulation has been associated with gold plating of assets; when the allowed rate of 
return, which is the regulator’s estimate of the cost of capital, is greater than the actual cost of capital, then 
the firm has an incentive to increase profits by increasing its asset base. This is the so called Averch-
Johnson (1962) effect. 
2 See, for example, Laffont and Tirole (1993), Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), Armstrong and Sappington 
(2007), and Joskow (2006, 2007)).   3
Generation Networks (NGNs), a subject that is currently under debate by OFCOM, the regulator 
for  the  UK  communications  industries.  As  stated  in  Ofcom  (2006),  the  challenge  for  ex  ante 
regulation  is  to  balance  the  dual  aims  of  both  promoting  competition  and  ensuring  efficient 
investment incentives are not distorted. 
 
The  theoretical  regulatory  economics  literature  (e.g.,  Laffont  and  Tirole  (1993))  typically 
(implicitly) assumes that the firm’s cost of capital is exogenous and independent of the nature of 
price regulation. Therefore, when PC and COS are compared, the costs and benefits associated 
with each type of regulation are not adequately considered.  
 
An earlier literature has investigated the relationship between price regulation and cost of capital.  
Peltzman  (1976)  develops  a  one-period  model  where  demand  and  cost  are  stochastic  and 
uncertainty is resolved at the end of the period. The regulator waits until uncertainty is resolved 
and then sets the regulated price to maximise welfare. As Peltzman’s model considers a COS-
type regulation (that is, prices are set in line with realised demand and cost), it predicts that any 
economic shock will be buffered by the regulator. Peltzman concludes that the variability of profits 
(and stock prices) should be lower under regulation than under an unregulated market.  
 
Alexander,  Mayer  and  Weeds  (1996),  Robinson  and  Taylor  (1998),  Alexander,  Estache  and 
Oliveri (2000), Binder and Norton (1999), Nwaeze (2000) and Paleari and Redondi (2005) use 
econometric methods and/or financial models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to 
investigate the firm’s cost of capital under regulation. More specifically, this literature examines 
the difference in the beta parameter or stock price volatility across regulatory systems and pre 
and  post  regulatory  events.  The  basic  conclusion  is  that  the  firm’s  cost  of  capital  under  PC 
regulation  is  higher  than  under  COS  regulation.  Consistent  with  this  literature,  we  develop  a 
theoretical model that confirms this result. We show that there is a trade-off between lower cost 
efficiency under COS regulation and a higher cost of capital under PC regulation. 
 
A more recent literature includes De Fraja and Stones (2004) and Stones (2007) who investigate 
how different types of ex ante price regulation that are contingent on ex post costs can alter the 
firm’s cost of capital. In their model regulated prices are set before the firm’s investment and 
financing decisions, but prices are contingent on future realised costs. Also, prices are set so that 
the firm faces no risk of bankruptcy and the cost of debt is equal to the risk-free rate. 
  
De Fraja and Stones (2004) assume that the cost of equity always exceeds the cost of debt and 
the cost of equity increases with the level of debt. Consequently, optimal regulated prices are 
such that the firm issues a positive level of debt, as this yields a lower expected price (due to the 
lower cost of capital) and a higher consumer surplus. In Stones (2007), the cost of equity is 
determined by the covariance of the return to shareholders and the market return, and its value   4
depends on the nature of regulation. For instance, when prices are set ex ante to cover the firm’s 
ex post costs (a form of COS regulation), the firm’s cost of capital is equal to the risk-free rate. 
This follows as the return on equity is constant and does not depend on the state of nature. Thus, 
the covariance of the return to shareholders and the market return is zero and the cost of equity 
equals the cost of debt and the risk-free return. In contrast to De Fraja and Stones, the cost of 




In contrast to the existing literature, our paper investigates the implication of PC regulation for the 
regulated firm’s cost of capital. Consistent with regulatory practice, we assume that under PC the 
regulator sets an ex ante  price cap  before the firm’s investment and financing decisions and 
uncertainty  resolution.  In  order  to  evaluate  the  welfare  generated  by  PC,  we  consider  as  a 
benchmark the COS regulation whereby price is set ex post to firm’s investment and financing 
decisions  and  uncertainty  resolution  so  that  the  regulated  revenue  covers  exactly  the  firm’s 
operational and capital costs. This modelling choice allows us to explore the contrast between the 
fixed price and cost-plus nature of regulatory contracts. 
 
While we show that the entrepreneur can be more efficient under PC regulation than under COS 
regulation, we find that the former type of regulation may yield either a higher cost of capital or a 
higher rent to the firm – and, therefore, lower welfare – than the latter type of regulation. This 
result is consistent with the existing empirical evidence described. Which regulation is superior 
will depend on a comparison of the extent of moral hazard and the effect on the cost of capital 
that arises from setting prices ex ante and creating, therefore, the risk of bankruptcy.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the modelling framework and the 
optimal  choices  made  by  an  unregulated  monopolist.  In  section  3  we  characterise  the 
entrepreneur’s optimal choice and welfare under COS regulation and then we solve the problem 
of a regulator that uses PC regulation to set the price of the regulated firm. Section 4 compares 
the welfare generated by the two different types of price regulation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 Taggart (1981), Spiegel (1994, 1996) and Spiegel and Spulber (1994, 1997) also develop models that take 
into account different types of funding but they focus on the firm’s capital structure instead of cost of 
capital. 
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2. The Benchmark Model  
An infrastructure project requires a fixed investment  I  and it is completed in one period. The 
project is undertaken by a risk-neutral entrepreneur who holds cash on hand  I H < . To fund the 
project, the entrepreneur must borrow an amount  H I D − ≥  from risk-neutral lenders.  
 
Lenders  behave  competitively  and  are  subject  to  a  zero  profit  constraint;  the  rate  of  return 
expected by lenders is the risk free rate  f k . If the entrepreneur borrows H I D − > , then the 
entrepreneur invests the amount  ( ) D I H − −  in a Treasury bond that provides the risk-free return 
f k , that is, the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost is equal to  f k . Also, the entrepreneur’s liability is 
limited and thus the income he derives from the project is non-negative.  
 
The cost to operate the infrastructure project is  { } c c C , α ∈ , where  1 0 < <α  and  0 > c . The 
cost depends on the level of effort  { } ε , 0 ∈ E  undertaken by the entrepreneur as follows:  
 
,with probability  ( )
, where  ( ) (0) 











The effort level chosen by the entrepreneur is not observable. Consumers are risk-neutral. The 
infrastructure  service  provider  is  a  monopolist  and  faces  an  inverse  demand  function 
characterised by a choke price  P . At any price less than or equal to  P  demand is equal to Q .  
Without loss of generality we set Q = 1. At any price greater than P  demand is equal to zero.  
 
In the first period ( 0 = t ), the entrepreneur chooses the level of effort  E  and the level of debt 
( ) E D   to  maximise  profit  given  price  P   and  taking  into  account  the  cost  of  debt  ( ) ( ) • , E D k
E
D  
determined in the debt market. It takes one period to build the network. In the second period (
1 = t ), the infrastructure project is completed, the demand and the operational cost to run the 
infrastructure are realised and the service is provided to consumers. The sales revenue is then 
used to cover expenditures in the same order of priority as defined in basic financial statements, 
namely (1) the operational cost C ; (2) bondholders; and (3) the entrepreneur. 
 
The expected total welfare at  1 = t  is equal to ( ) E CS λπ + , where CS  is the expected consumer 
surplus,  ( ) E π  is the entrepreneur’s expected profit and  1 0 < < λ  is the weight assigned to the 
entrepreneur’s profit. The entrepreneur’s expected profit must be non-negative, that is, it must 
satisfy the participation constraint (otherwise, no investment would take place). To simplify the   6
analysis we assume that the minimum price that satisfies the firm’s participation constraint for any 
level of effort  E  and level of debt  ( ) E D  is  c P ≥ . This assumption allows us to focus on the 
effects of price regulation on the cost of capital and it is consistent with the notion that capital 
costs represent the bulk of total costs of infrastructure businesses.   
 
We  now  turn  to  the  case  of  an  unregulated  monopolist  service  provider.  We  solve  the 
monopolist’s problem backwards. We start at period  1 = t  and calculate the entrepreneur’s net 
payoff for the two states of nature: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } { } c c C for E E D I k E E D I k E D E D k C P Max E F f f
E
D , , 1 , 1 , 1 α ∈ − − + − − − + − • + − − =      
(1) 
 
The  expression  for  ( ) E F   follows  from  the  limited  liability  constraint;  if  the  firm’s  revenue  is 
insufficient to pay debt plus interest, the entrepreneur’s maximum loss is equal to the equity and 
effort used in the project. We can determine the lenders’ payoff in a similar vein:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } { } c c C for C P E D E D k Max E R
E
D , , , , 1 α ∈ − • + =      (2) 
 
The  expression  for  ( ) E R   again  reflects  the  limited  liability  constraint;  if  the  firm’s  revenue  is 
insufficient to pay debt plus interest, lenders receive the total revenue as payment.  
 
We now determine the cost of debt. If the firm’s revenue is sufficient to pay debt plus interest in 
all states of nature (i.e., when  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c E D E D k P
E
D + • + ≥ , 1 ), there is no default risk and, therefore:  
 
( ) ( ) f
E
D k E D k = • ,  .                  (3) 
 
In contrast, when the firm’s revenue is insufficient to pay debt plus interest when the realised 
operational cost is  c (i.e., when  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c E D E D k P
E
D + • + ≤ , 1 ), the cost of default is determined by 
using expression (2) as follows:
 4  
 





c P E p E D E D k E p
E D
+
− − + • +
=
1
1 , 1  
 
Rearranging this expression yields:  
                                                 
4 We dismiss the case where the firm’s revenue is insufficient to pay debt in all states of nature as in this 
case bondholders would not provide capital and the entrepreneur would not invest. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



















, .    (4) 
 
Note that the cost of equity is equal to  f k . Having established the cost of debt and equity, we 
now determine the monopolist’s choice of capital structure, as per the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma  1:  The  monopolist  firm  always  (weakly)  chooses  the  minimum  amount  of  debt 
( ) H I E D − = , independently of being unregulated or regulated.  
 
The proof is straightforward. Recall that the cost of equity is always less than or equal to the cost 
of debt. Thus the monopolist firm is either indifferent between debt and equity (when the cost of 
debt is equal to the cost of equity) or strictly prefers equity to debt (when the cost of debt is larger 
than the cost of equity). For simplicity,  we assume henceforth that the entrepreneur chooses 
( ) H I D E D − = = . We anticipate that the level of debt does not depend on whether the market is 
regulated or not since the entrepreneur does not have the power (under PC) or the incentives 
(under COS) to use the level of debt strategically to increase regulated prices.
5 
 
Having determined that the amount of debt does not depend on the level of effort, we can now 
proceed to analyse the monopolist’s optimal choice of effort. We also anticipate that the level of 
effort does depend on whether the market is regulated and also on the type of regulation. In this 
section we focus on the unregulated monopolist’s decision.  
 
The entrepreneur chooses to undertake  ε = E  only if the following two constraints are satisfied: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ≥ − + − − • − + − − − + − = ε ε α ε ε π
ε H k H I H I k c P p c P p f D 1 , 1 1  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )H k H I H I k c P p c P p f D + − − • − + − − − + − = 1 , 1 0 1 0 0
0 α π  (IC) 
 
and 
( ) 0 π ε ≥ . (PR) 
 
If  the  incentive  compatibility  (IC)  constraint  is  not  satisfied,  then  the  entrepreneur  undertakes 
0 = E  as long as  ( ) 0 0 ≥ π . Note that we can rewrite the IC constraint as follows:  
 
                                                 
5 Taggart (1981), Spiegel (1994, 1996) and Spiegel and Spulber (1994, 1997) consider a different type of 
regulation where the firm can use the level of debt to increase regulated prices. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) H I H I k H I k c p p D D − • − − • − + − − ≤ , , 0 1
0 ε ε α ε .    (5) 
 
The term ε  is the direct cost whereas  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ε α  is the direct benefit of undertaking a 
positive  effort  in  the  form  of  a  lower  expected  marginal  cost.  The  term
 
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) H I H I k H I k D D − • − − • − , ,
0 ε  is the difference between the total cost of debt (debt plus interest) 
when  0 = E  and when  ε = E . Expression (5) then states that it will be incentive compatible for 
the  unregulated  monopolist  to  undertake  level  of  effort  ε   as  long  as  the  resource  cost  of 
undertaking such effort is less than or equal to the sum of the expected benefit in terms of lower 
operational costs plus the change in the total cost of debt associated with a positive effort.  
 
Whether or not the IC constraint is satisfied depends on the choke price. For a sufficiently large 
P  (i.e., when  ( )( ) c H I k P f + − + ≥ 1 ), the cost of debt is equal to the risk-free rate under both 
levels of effort and therefore (5) is reduced to:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε . (6) 
 
In contrast, if the risk of default is positive regardless of the level of effort (i.e.,  ( )( ) c H I k P f + − + < 1
), the cost of debt is higher than the risk-free rate and then (5) can be rewritten as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )












+ − − ≤ ,  (7) 
 
Where  ( )( ) ( ] H I k f − + ∈ 1 , 0 τ .        
Note that  ( ) ( ) ( )










p p , that is, a positive effort decreases the total cost of debt. The reason is 
that  a  positive  effort  increases  the  probability  of  a  low  cost  scenario  ( ( ) ( ) 0 p p > ε ),  that  is,  it 
decreases the probability of default and also the cost of debt (see equation (4)). Note also that 
the lower the  P  (the higherτ ) the higher ε  can be for the entrepreneur to undertake  ε = E . 
That is, the difference between the total cost of debt when  0 = E  and when  ε = E  increases as 






Lemma  2:  Table  1  summarises  the  threshold  levels  that  ε   must  satisfy  in  order  for  the 
entrepreneur to undertake  ε = E .    9
 
Table 1: Threshold Level for  ε = E  
P   ≤ ε  
( )( ) τ − + − + = c H I k P f 1 , where  ( )( ) ( ] H I k f − + ∈ 1 , 0 τ   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )












+ − −  
( )( ) c H I k P f + − + ≥ 1   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ε α  
                                                
The  characterisation  of  the  unregulated  monopolist’s  choices  of  D   and  E  allows  us  to 
determine total welfare as follows: 
 
Lemma 3: If the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E , then overall welfare in an unregulated industry 
M W  is equal to  ( ) ε λπ . Otherwise, overall welfare is equal to  ( ) 0 λπ  if  ( ) 0 0 ≥ π  or  0  if the 
entrepreneur does not invest. 
 
In  the  next  Section  we  will  compare  the  outcome  of  both  COS  and  PC  regulation  with  the 
outcome of the unregulated monopolist. In particular, under PC regulation the regulator will make 
full use of the information on Lemma 2 (with P replaced by the regulated price  R P ) to explore the 
trade-off between rent extraction and satisfying the IC and PR constraints in order to maximise 
total welfare.   
 
3. Infrastructure Regulation  
 
In  this  Section,  we  assume  that  the  price  is  set  by  a  risk-neutral  regulator  who  has  perfect 
information about  I ,P  and  Q .  At  0 = t , the regulator reveals whether it will apply a COS or 
PC  regulatory  framework.  In  the  case  of  the  former,  prices  will  be  set  ex  post  and  will  be 
conditional  on  the  realisation  of  costs,  while  in  the  case  of  the  latter,  a  single  price  R P   is 
announced  at  0 = t .  At  1 = t ,  the  regulator  observes  C   but  does  not  observe  E .  The 
regulator’s objective function is to maximise expected overall welfare at  1 = t .    10
3.1 Cost of Service Regulation  
 
We proceed to describe the COS regulation that will be used as a benchmark to evaluate the 
welfare generated by PC regulation. Under COS regulation, at  1 = t , after the entrepreneur’s 
choices of D  and E, and subsequently to the resolution of cost uncertainty, the regulator sets a 
price  P
 
when  c C α =  or a price  P
 
when  c C = . Thus, the regulated price always covers the 
operational and capital costs. This is known in advance.  
 
As operational and capital costs are always covered, there is no risk of default and the firm’s cost 
of capital is always equal to  f k . Thus, the entrepreneur is indifferent between any level of debt 
[ ] I H I D , − ∈ .  As  said  in  the  previous  section,  we  assume  that  the  entrepreneur  chooses 
. H I D − =  The following proposition characterises the choice of effort by the entrepreneur and 
the optimal (ex post) prices under COS regulation. 
 
Proposition 1: Under COS regulation the entrepreneur always chooses  0 = E . The optimal ex 
post prices are given by:  
 
( ) c I k P f α + + = 1  when  c C α =  and  ( ) c I k P f + + = 1  when  c C = . 
 
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix. This proposition simply states that society bears 
the full extent of moral hazard under COS regulation but the cost of capital is minimised and 
equal to the risk-free rate.  
        
Proposition 1 allows us to compute the expected overall welfare from COS regulation evaluated 
at  1 = t  as follows: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k P P P p P P p W f COS 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 α − − − + − = − − + − = .    (8) 
 
3.2 Price Cap Regulation 
 
Under PC regulation, a single price  R P  is announced at  0 = t , before the entrepreneur’s choices 
of D  and E, and prior to the resolution of cost uncertainty. The regulator chooses the regulated 
price  R P  to maximise total welfare given by (9) below:  
   11
( ) ( ) E P P W Max R R PC
PR




( ) 0 ≥ E R π . (PR) 
 
( ) ( )
∗ ≥ E E R R π π , where  { } ε , 0 , ∈
∗ E E  and 




( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )


























− − − + −
+ − + ≥ − + − − − + − − − + −
=







c P E p c P E p Max
c H I k P if E H k E p E I k c P E p c P E p Max
E
f R f f
R f
R R
f R f f R R
R 1 1 , 1
1 1
1





To sum up,   R P  is fixed ex ante to the firm’s investment and financing decision to maximise 
expected welfare, the regulator offers a regulatory contract that anticipates a capital structure 
where H I D − = , and  the cost of debt is higher than or equal to the cost of equity.  
 
Table 2 below shows the optimal price caps for all possible parameter values. The proof is in the 
appendix. 
 
Proposition 2: Table 2 below summarises the optimal price cap given the IC and PR conditions: 
Table 2: Optimal Price Cap 
Constraints  ( ) E p   Optimal Price Cap 
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  
PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − ≥ + + 1 1  
-  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k f ε α ε − − + + + 1 1 1  
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  
PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H kf ε α ε − < + + 1 1  
( ) λ ε < p   ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1
 
( ) λ ε ≥ p   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − +
 
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε  
PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − ≥ +  
-  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k f 0 1 1 1 α − − + +
 
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p
p
p p
c p p f + − −
−







PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H kf 0 1 1 α − < +  
( ) λ < 0 p   ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1
 
( ) λ ≥ 0 p   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p H p I k f 0 1 1 0 1 1
2 α − − + − − +
 
IC( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p c p p 0 1 0 1 − − ≤ < − − ε α ε ε α
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ε ε α
ε
− + − −
−






PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H kf 0 1 1 α − < +  
( ) λ ε < p
 
( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1
 
( ) λ ≥ 0 p
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − +
 
( ) ( ) ε λ p p ≤ < 0
 
If   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H k p c p p p f + − + − − < 1 0 1
2 ε λ λ ε α ε ε , then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − + .  
Otherwise, ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1 .   12
 
Proposition 2 has important implications for the trade-off between rent extraction, optimal effort 
induction and the regulated firm’s cost of capital. To understand the nature of this trade-off, note 
that as  1 < λ  the regulator will extract the entire entrepreneur’s rent when the rate by which the 
firm’s cost of capital increases is sufficiently low. Conversely, when the negative impact on the 
entrepreneur’s rent is higher than the positive impact on consumer surplus, the regulator then 
sets the minimum price such that the firm’s cost of capital is equal to the risk-free rate. This price 
leaves a positive rent for the entrepreneur.  
 
Of course, the actual nature of the trade-off will depend on parameter values. Consider  R P  such 
that ( )( ) P P c H I k R f ≤ ≤ + − + 1 . It is easy to see that  ( ) ( ) 0 1
,







H I W ;  a decrease in  R P  
increases welfare as the positive impact on consumer surplus (1) is higher than the negative 
impact on the entrepreneur’s profit ( λ − ); a decrease in  R P  does not impact the cost of debt, 
only the expected revenue, which is always sufficient to pay total cost of debt in all states of 
nature. 
 
When parameter values are such that debt is paid under all states of nature, the regulated firm’s 
cost of capital is equal to the risk-free rate, and it does not depend on the level of effort. In this 
case, a price decrease does not cause any change in the firm’s cost of capital, and thus the 
regulator will set the lowest price possible, which is  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c E p E I k P f R α − − + + + = 1 1 1 , for  { } ε , 0 ∈ E , 
to extract all expected rent (so that the entrepreneur’s participation constraint is always binding). 
There is no trade-off between rent extraction, optimal effort choice and the cost of capital. The 
total welfare is then given by:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) E c E p c I k P W f PC − − + − + − = α 1 1  .       (10) 
 
The optimal choice of effort in equation (10) will depend on parameter values as described in 
rows one ( ε = E ) and three ( 0 = E ) of Table 2. 
 
Alternatively, for other parameter values, by reducing the regulated price to extract rents, the 
regulator affects the firm’s cost of capital and may affect the optimal choice of effort. In fact, 















, ;  whether 
a decrease in  R P  increases welfare depends on  ( ) E p . The rationale is as follows: a decrease in 
R P  has a positive impact on consumer surplus (1) and a negative impact on the entrepreneur’s   13
profit (
( ) E p
λ
− ). Furthermore, the entrepreneur’s profit is reduced because the expected revenue 
decreases ( λ − ) and the cost of debt increases ( ( ) ( )




λ ); the sum of these two effects is 
equal to 
( ) E p
λ
− . Thus, if  ( ) λ < E p , then a decrease in  R P  reduces welfare. In this case, the rate 
by which the cost of debt increases ( ( ) ( )
( ) E p
E p −
−
1 ) is sufficiently high and compensates the fact that 
the  consumers  surplus’  weight  is  higher  than  the  entrepreneur  profit’s  weight  in  the  welfare 
function ( 1 < λ ). The regulator then sets the minimum price such that the firm’s cost of capital is 
equal to  f k , that is,  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + = 1 , for  { } ε , 0 ∈ E . The welfare is given by:  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] E H k c E p c H I k P W f f PC − + − − + − − + − = 1 1 1 α λ         (11) 
 
where  ( ) ( ) ( )c E p E H k f α − < + + 1 1 .  Note  that  in  this  case  the  entrepreneur’s  expected  profit  is 
positive.  
 
However, if  ( ) λ ≥ E p , then a decrease in  R P  increases welfare. In this case, the rate by which the 
cost of debt increases is sufficiently low and is welfare enhancing to reduce prices because the 
consumer surplus’ weight is higher than the entrepreneur profit’s weight in the welfare function.
6 
The regulator then sets the lowest price possible extracting all rent (so that the entrepreneur’s 
participation constraint is binding), which is  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c E p E E p H E p I k P f R
2 1 1 1 1 α − − + + − − + = , for 
{ } ε , 0 ∈ E . In this case, welfare is given by:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E E p c E p H E p I k P W f PC − − − − − − + − =
2 1 1 1 1 α  .       (12) 
 
The  optimal  choice  of  effort  in  equations  (11)  and  (12)  will  depend  on  parameter  values  as 
described in rows two ( ε = E ), four ( 0 = E ) and five ( ε = E  and  0 = E ) of Table 2. 
 
                                                 
6 Note that if  ( ) λ = E p , then welfare is constant within this price range. We assume that if  ( ) λ = E p  the 
regulator sets price as low as possible.   14
4. The benefits and costs of PC and COS regulatory 
regimes  
 
We now compare the welfare generated by the two different types of regulatory regimes. First, we 
note that under COS regulation the entrepreneur always undertakes  0 = E , the firm’s cost of 
capital is always equal to  f k  and the entrepreneur’s profit is always equal to zero. Under PC 
regulation,  however,  the  entrepreneur  undertakes  either  0 = E   or  ε = E ,  the  firm’s  cost  of 
capital is higher than or equal to  f k  and the entrepreneur’s expected profit is higher than or 
equal  to  zero.  As  we  will  see  below,  whether  PC  regulation  is  welfare  superior  depends  on 
parameter  values.  Proposition  3  below  compares  the  welfare  generated  by  COS  and  PC 
regulatory regimes across all parameter values. The proof is in the appendix.  
 
Proposition 3: Table 3 below compares the PC and COS regulatory regimes for all parameter 
values expressed in terms of the IC and PR constraints under PC regulation:   
 
Table 3: Optimal Regulation 
Constraints  ( ) E p   Optimal Regulation 
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  
PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − ≥ + + 1 1  
-  COS PC W W ≥  
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  
PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H kf ε α ε − < + + 1 1  
( ) λ ε < p  
COS PC W W ≥
 
if  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p H k c p f f + − − ≥ − + − − 1 0 1 1 1 α ε ε α λ
 
( ) λ ε ≥ p  
COS PC W W ≥
 
if   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H k p c p p p f + − + − − ≤ 1 1 0 1
2 ε ε α ε ε  
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε  
PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − ≥ +  
-  COS PC W W =
 
IC  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p
p
p p
c p p f + − −
−







PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H kf 0 1 1 α − < +  
-  COS PC W W <
 
IC( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p c p p 0 1 0 1 − − ≤ < − − ε α ε ε α
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ε ε α
ε
− + − −
−






PR ( ) ( ) ( )c p H kf 0 1 1 α − < +  
( ) λ ε < p
 
COS PC W W <
 
( ) λ ≥ 0 p
 
COS PC W W ≥
 
if   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H k p c p p p f + − + − − ≤ 1 1 0 1
2 ε ε α ε ε    .
 
( ) ( ) ε λ p p ≤ < 0
 
If    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H k p c p p p f + − + − − < 1 0 1
2 ε λ λ ε α ε ε and  if  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H k p c p p p f + − + − − ≤ 1 1 0 1
2 ε ε α ε ε , then 
COS PC W W ≥ . Otherwise 
COS PC W W < . 
 
Proposition  3  shows  that  whether  PC  regulation  is  welfare  superior  depends  on  the  trade-off 
between a higher cost efficiency under PC and a lower cost of capital (or a lower entrepreneur’s   15
rent) under COS. In particular, when under PC regulation the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E , 
the regulator may be able to set a  lower price under PC regulation than under COS regulation. 
The reason is that under PC regulation the regulator is able to extract the rent differential that 
stems from a positive effort in comparison to a zero level of effort and transfer it to consumer 
surplus through a lower regulated price.  
 
Conversely,  when  under  PC  regulation  the  firm’s  cost  of  capital  is  higher  than  f k   or  the 
entrepreneur’s profit is positive, then the regulator may not be able to set a lower price under PC 
regulation than under COS regulation The reason is that the regulator extracts less rent under PC 
than under COS regulation; by reducing the regulated price to extract rents under PC regulation, 
the regulator may affect the firm’s cost of capital. When the impact on the firm’s cost of capital is 
sufficiently  low,  the  regulator  will  lower  the  price  because  the  positive  impact  on  consumer’s 
surplus  outweighs  the  negative  impact  on  firm’s  cost  of  capital  (and  entrepreneur’s  profit). 
However, if the impact on firm’s cost of capital is sufficiently high, the regulator will set the price 
so that there is no bankruptcy risk and the cost of capital is equal to the risk-free risk as the 
negative impact on the firm’s cost of capital (and entrepreneur’s profit) outweighs the positive 
impact on consumer surplus.  
 
As with Proposition 2, the actual nature of the trade-off depends on parameter values. We have 
seen that when under PC regulation  R P  is such that ( )( ) P P c H I k R f ≤ ≤ + − + 1 , then the regulated 
firm’s cost of capital is equal to the risk-free rate (as debt is paid under all states of nature). The 
regulator then sets the lowest price possible to extract all expected rent. In this case, note that 
under both types of regulation the firm’s cost of capital is equal to  f k  and the entrepreneur’s 
expected profit is zero. Thus, if the entrepreneur undertakes  0 = E  under PC regulation, then 
both  types  of  regulatory  regimes  provide  the  same  price  (consumer  surplus)  and  welfare. 
However, if the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E  under PC regulation, then this higher level of 
effort allows the regulator to set a price lower than or equal to the expected price under COS 
regulation. The optimal choice of effort under PC will depend on parameter values as described in 
rows one ( ε = E ) and three ( 0 = E ) of Table 3. 
 
Alternatively, for other parameter values, we have seen that by reducing the regulated price to 
extract rents under PC regulation, the regulator affects the firm’s cost of capital. When    R P  is 















, ;  and whether a decrease in 
R P  increases welfare depends on  ( ) E p . Moreover, a decrease in  R P  has a positive impact on   16
consumer surplus (1) and a negative impact on the entrepreneur’s profit (
( ) E p
λ
− ) due to a lower 
revenue ( λ − ) and a higher cost of capital ( ( ) ( )




λ ).  
 
Thus, if  ( ) λ < E p , then the rate by which the cost of debt increases ( ( ) ( )
( ) E p
E p −
−
1 ) is sufficiently 
high  and  compensates  for  the  fact  that  the  consumers  surplus’  weight  is  higher  than  the 
entrepreneur profit’s weight in the welfare function ( 1 < λ ). The regulator then sets the minimum 
price such that the firm’s cost of capital is equal to  f k . In this case, under both types of regulatory 
regimes the firm’s cost of capital is equal to  f k . However, the entrepreneur’s expected profit is 
positive  under  PC  regulation  and  equal  to  zero  under  COS  regulation.  Thus,  we  have  the 
following:  If  the  entrepreneur  undertakes  0 = E   under  PC  regulation,  then  COS  regulation  is 
welfare  superior.  The  reason  is  that  under  COS  the  regulator  is  able  to  extract  the  entire 
economic rent from the entrepreneur and the cost of capital is equal to the risk-free rate whereas 
under PC the regulator must give a minimum positive rent for the entrepreneur in order to keep 
the cost of capital equal to the risk-free return. Thus, the regulator extracts less rent under PC 
than under COS. This rent differential allows the regulator to set a lower expected price under 
COS than the price under PC regulation. However, if the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E  under 
PC regulation, then there is a trade-off between a higher level of effort under PC regulation and 
no economic rent left for the entrepreneur under COS regulation. Whether the regulator will be 
able  to  set  a  lower  price  under  PC  than  the  expected  price  under  COS,  will  depend  on  the 
parameter values. 
 
If  ( ) λ ≥ E p , then the rate by which the cost of debt increases under PC is sufficiently low and it is 
welfare enhancing to reduce prices because the positive impact on consumer surplus outweighs 
the negative impact on the firm’s cost of capital (and entrepreneur’s profit). The regulator then 
sets the lowest price possible to extract all rent (so that the entrepreneur’s participation constraint 
is binding). In this case, under both types of regulatory regimes the entrepreneur’s expected profit 
is equal to zero. However, the firm’s cost of capital is higher than  f k  under PC regulation and 
equal to  f k  under COS regulation. Thus, we have the following: If the entrepreneur undertakes 
0 = E  under PC regulation, then COS regulation is welfare superior. The reason is the same as in 
the previous case. That is, because the firm’s cost of capital is higher under PC than under COS 
(instead  of  a  higher  rent  under  PC  than  under  COS,  as  in  the  previous  case),  the  regulator 
extracts less rent under PC than under COS. This rent differential allows the regulator to set a 
lower expected price under COS than the price under PC regulation. However, if the entrepreneur 
undertakes  ε = E  under PC regulation, then there is a trade-off between a higher level of effort 
under PC regulation and a lower cost of capital under COS regulation. Whether the regulator will   17
be able to set a lower price under PC than the expected price under COS, will depend on the 
parameter values. 
 
The optimal choice of effort under PC regulation when the cost of debt is higher than the risk-free 
return (or the entrepreneur’s profit is positive) will depend on parameter values as described in 




We have investigated the relationship between price regulation and the cost of capital in a two-
period  model  in  which  the  regulator  faces  moral  hazard  and  the  entrepreneur  is  capital 
constrained. In our model, the cost of debt is higher than or equal to the cost of equity. Thus, the 
entrepreneur chooses the minimum level of debt possible.   
 
In  contrast  to  the  previous  papers,  our  model  fully  explores  the  implications  of  the  timing 
associated with the price-setting process. Thus, we assume that under COS regulation price is 
set ex post to firm’s investment and financing decisions and uncertainty resolution so that the 
regulated revenue covers exactly the firm’s operational and capital costs. Under PC regulation, 
we assume that the regulator sets an ex ante price cap before the firm’s investment and financing 
decisions and uncertainty resolution.  This modelling choice allows us to fully explore the contrast 
between the cost-plus and fixed price nature of regulatory contracts.  
 
Thus, we have seen that when the cost of capital under PC is equal to the risk-free rate, PC 
regulation generates at least the same welfare as COS regulation. In particular, if the extent of 
moral hazard is significant, then PC regulation is welfare superior. However, when the cost of 
capital under PC regulation is higher than the risk-free rate (or the entrepreneur’s profit is positive 
because the rate by which the cost of capital increases is sufficiently high), then we have the 
following: if the extent of moral hazard is insignificant, then COS regulation is welfare superior; if 
the extent of moral hazard is significant, then there is a trade-off between a higher cost efficiency 
under PC regulation and a lower cost of capital or lower economic rent under COS regulation.  
 
In summary, this paper has provided a channel through which PC regulation affects the cost of 
capital of the regulated firm. Therefore, it has shown that any comparison between PC and COS 
regulatory regimes has to take into account the trade-off between higher cost of capital and less 
moral hazard.  
 
   18
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
Under COS regulation the regulator does not observe  E  and sets P
 
when  c C α =  and P
 
when 
c C =  such that the regulated price always covers operational and capital costs. Under such 
prices, the entrepreneur’s profit is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 


= − + − − =
= − + − − =
=
c C if E I k c P













at any level. From the equation above, the entrepreneur never chooses  ε = E , as 
he can always guarantee higher profits by choosing  0 = E . It follows that the welfare maximising 
regulated ex post prices (that guarantee zero profits and maximise consumer surplus) are equal 
to ( ) c I k P f α + + = 1  and  ( ) c I k P f + + = 1 . □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
 
We begin this Proof by showing that there are only five cases to examine. Then, we proceed to 
state these cases. First, assume that the minimum price that satisfies the participation constraint 
is higher than or equal to ( )( ) c H I kf + − + 1 . Recall from Lemma 2 that in this case the entrepreneur 
chooses  only  one  level  of  effort  { } ε , 0 ∈ E   within  this  price  range.  Indeed,  the  decision  of 
undertaking a positive effort depends only on the resource cost of undertaking such effort (ε ) 
being less than or equal to the expected benefit in terms of lower expected operational costs (
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ε α ). These cases are stated as Cases 1 and 2 below. 
 
Second, assume that the minimum price that satisfies the participation constraint is lower than 
( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1 .  We  know  from  Lemma  2  that  when  price  is  lower  than  ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1   the 
decision of undertaking a positive effort depends on the resource cost of undertaking such effort (
ε ) being less than or equal to the sum of the expected benefit in terms of lower operational costs 
(( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ε α ) plus the change in the total cost of debt associated with a positive effort (
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) H I H I k H I k D D − • − − • − , ,




positive and increases as price decreases. Thus, if the threshold to undertake a positive effort is 
reached at a specific price, the entrepreneur will undertake a positive effort for all prices lower or 
equal to this price. Thus, we have three cases to consider: In the first two cases the entrepreneur   21
chooses only one level of effort  { } ε , 0 ∈ E  for all 
R P
 
such that the PR constraint is satisfied. In the 
third case, there is a price  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + < 1  such that if 
R R P P >  the entrepreneur undertakes 
0 = E  and if  R R P P ≤  the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E .  These cases are stated below as 
Cases 3, 4 and 5.  
 
Case 1:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − ≥ + + 1 1 .  
 
Lemma 2 states that if  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε , then the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E  for all 
R P   such  that  the  participation  constraint  is  satisfied.  If  ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − ≥ + + 1 1 ,  then  the 
minimum price that satisfies the participation constraint is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + ≥ 1  (we can find that 
by substituting  R P
 
in  ( ) ε π R ). We have seen that within the price range  ( )( ) [ ] P c H I k f , 1 + − +
 
we have 
( ) ( ) 0 1
,







H I W .  Thus,  the  optimal  price  cap  is  the  minimum  price  that  satisfies  the 
participation  constraint,  which  is  equal  to  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k f ε α ε − − + + + 1 1 1   (we  find  this  price  by 
setting  ( ) 0 = ε π R ).   
 
Case 2:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε , ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − < + + 1 1 .  
 
Lemma 2 states that if  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε , then the entrepreneur undertakes  ε = E  for all 
R P   such  that  the  participation  constraint  is  satisfied.  If  ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − < + + 1 1 ,  then  the 
minimum price that satisfies the participation constraint is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + < 1  (we can find that 
by substituting  R P
 
in  ( ) ε π R ). We have seen that within the price range  ( )( ) [ ) c H I k c f + − + 1 ,  we have 
















, . Thus, if  ( ) λ ε < p , then the optimal price cap is  ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1 . If 
( ) λ ε ≥ p ,  then  the  optimal  price  cap  is  the  minimum  price  that  satisfies  the  participation 
constraint
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − +
 
(we find this price by setting  ( ) 0 = ε π R ).   
 
Case 3:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − ≥ + . 
 
Lemma 2 states that if  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε , then the entrepreneur undertakes  0 = E  for all 
( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + ≥ 1   such  that  the  participation  constraint  is  satisfied.  If  ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − ≥ + , 
then the minimum price that satisfies the participation constraint is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + ≥ 1  (we can   22
find that by substituting  R P
 
in  ( ) 0 R π ). We have seen that within the price range  ( )( ) [ ] P c H I k f , 1 + − +
 
we have  ( ) ( ) 0 1
,







H I W . Thus, the optimal price cap is the minimum price that satisfies 
the  participation  constraint,  which  is  equal  to  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k f 0 1 1 1 α − − + +   (we  find  this  price  by 
setting  ( ) 0 0 = R π ). 
 
Case 4:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p
p
p p
c p p f + − −
−





ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − < + . 
 
Lemma  2  states  that  if  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k cQ p
p
p p
cQ p p f + − −
−





ε α ε ,  then  the 
entrepreneur undertakes  0 = E  for all  c PR ≥  such that the participation constraint is satisfied. If 
( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − < + ,  then  the  minimum  price  that  satisfies  the  participation  constraint  is 
( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + < 1  (we can find that by substituting  R P
 
in  ( ) 0 R π ). We have seen that within the 
















PC λ . Thus, if  ( ) λ < 0 p , then the 
optimal price cap is ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1 . If  ( ) λ ≥ 0 p , then the optimal price cap is the minimum price 
that satisfies the participation constraint, which is equal to
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p H p I k f 0 1 1 0 1 1
2 α − − + − − +
 
(we find this price by setting  ( ) 0 0 = R π ). 
 
Case  5:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ε ε α
ε
ε α ε − + − −
−
+ − − ≤ H k c p
p
p p
c p p f 1 1
0
0
0 1   and 
( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − < + .  
 
Lemma  2  states  that  if  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε     and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ε ε α
ε
ε α ε − + − −
−
+ − − ≤ H k c p
p
p p
c p p f 1 1
0
0
0 1 ,  then  the  entrepreneur  undertakes  two 
levels  of  effort  within  the  price  range  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ) c H I k c p p H p I k f f + − + − − + + − − + 1 , 1 1 1 1
2 ε α ε ε ε . 
More  specifically,  there  is  a  price  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ) c H I k c p p H p I k P f f R + − + − − + + − − + ∈ 1 , 1 1 1 1
2 ε α ε ε ε  
such  that  if  R R P P >   the  entrepreneur  undertakes  0 = E   and  if  R R P P ≤
 
the  entrepreneur 
undertakes  ε = E .  If  ( ) ( ) ( )H k c p f + > − 1 0 1 α ,  then  the  minimum  price  that  satisfies  the 
participation constraint is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + < 1  (we can find that by substituting  R P
 
in  ( ) 0 R π ). 
 
We have seen in Cases 2 and 4 that if  ( ) λ ε < p  and  ( ) λ < 0 p , then the optimal price cap is 
( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1 . Thus, if  ( ) ( ) λ ε < < p p 0 , then the optimal price cap is  ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1 . We have   23
also seen that  if  ( ) λ ε ≥ p  and  ( ) λ ≥ 0 p , then the optimal price cap is the minimum price that 
satisfies  the  participation  constraint.  Thus,  if  ( ) ( ) ε λ p p < ≤ 0 ,  then  the  optimal  price  cap  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − + . 
 
It is easy to see that if we have  ( ) ( ) ε λ p p ≤ < 0 , then the optimal price cap will be ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1
 
or  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε


















D W ε .  By 
calculating  (12)  -  (11),  where  ε = E   in  (12)  and  0 = E   in  (11),  we  find  that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − +  is welfare superior if: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H p k c p p p f ε λ λ ε α ε ε − + + − − < 1 0 1
2   (13) 
 
Otherwise, ( )( ) c H I k f + − + 1
 
is the optimal price cap. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
 
We proceed to prove Proposition 3 using the cases obtained in Proposition 2.  
 
Case 1:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − ≥ + + 1 1 . 
 
We  know  from  Proposition  2  that  under  these  market  conditions  the  optimal  price  cap  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k P f R ε α ε − − + + + = 1 1 1 . By taking the difference between (10) ( ε = E ) and (8) we find 
that  the  PC  always  generates  at  least  the  same  welfare  as  the  COS  since 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε . 
 
Case 2:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − ≤ ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f ε α ε − < + + 1 1 . 
 
We know from Proposition 2 that if  ( ) λ ε < p the optimal price cap is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + = 1 . By taking 
the difference between (11) ( ε = E ) and (8) we find that the PC will generate at least the same 
welfare  as  the  COS  if  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p H k c p f f + − − ≥ − + − − 1 0 1 1 1 α ε ε α λ .  We  know  from 
Proposition 2 that if  ( ) λ ε ≥ p
 
the optimal price cap is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − + . 
By taking the difference between (12) ( ε = E ) and (8) we find that the PC will generate at least 
the same welfare as the COS if  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )H k p c p p p f + − + − − ≤ 1 1 0 1
2 ε ε α ε ε . 
 
 
Case 3:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − ≥ + . 
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We  know  from  Proposition  2  that  under  these  market  conditions  the  optimal  price  cap  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p I k P f R 0 1 1 1 α − − + + = . By taking the difference between (10) ( 0 = E ) and (8) we find that 
the PC will generate the same welfare as the COS.  
 
Case 4:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p
p
p p
c p p f + − −
−





ε α ε  and ( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − < + . 
 
We  know  from  Proposition  2  that  if  ( ) λ < 0 p the  optimal  price  cap  is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + = 1 .  By 
taking the difference between (11) ( 0 = E ) and (8) we find that the PC is welfare inferior as we 
never have  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] H k c p H k c p f f + − − ≥ + − − 1 0 1 1 0 1 α α λ . We know from Proposition 2 that 
if  ( ) λ ≥ 0 p
 
the optimal price cap is  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p H p I k f 0 1 1 0 1 1
2 α − − + − − + . By taking the difference 
between  (12)  ( 0 = E )  and  (8)  we  find  that  the  PC  is  welfare  inferior  as  we  never  have 
( ) ( ) ( )H k c p f + ≤ − 1 0 1 α .  
 
Case  5:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p 0 1 − − > ε α ε ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ε ε α
ε
ε α ε − + − −
−
+ − − ≤ H k c p
p
p p






( ) ( ) ( )c p H k f 0 1 1 α − < + . 
 
We know from Proposition 2 that if  ( ) λ ε < p
 
the optimal price cap is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + = 1  (See 
Proof of Case 4). If  ( ) λ ≥ 0 p , the optimal price cap is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − +  
(See  Proof  of  Case  2).  If  ( ) ( ) ε λ p p ≤ < 0 ,  then  the  optimal  price  cap  is  ( )( ) c H I k P f R + − + = 1
 
or 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c p p H p I k f ε α ε ε ε
2 1 1 1 1 − − + + − − + . If the former is the optimal price cap then see Proof 
of Case 4. If the latter is the optimal price cap then see Proof of Case 2. □ 